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A CONVERSATION ABOUT ABORTION 
BETWEEN JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND  
THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
Duane L. Ostler* 
It is dark at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. The historic 
scene where the U.S. Constitution was hammered out in the hot 
summer of 1787 is completely still; the chairs empty, the hall 
silent. The only movement in the stuffy hall is that of a cockroach 
scavenging for nonexistent food along the periphery of the hall, 
whose presence would no doubt cause the janitor to be fired for 
not using enough insect spray. 
But hark! A sudden ghostly shadow has appeared at the 
President’s chair! Its misty shape has an uncanny resemblance to 
none other than George Washington, minus his ivory teeth 
(since ghosts don’t eat). Appearing not far to his left is James 
Madison, proficient note taker in the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention, who once more spreads out his notes, ready for 
action. The ghosts of other luminaries also make their entrance 
into the hall. There is Benjamin Franklin, his pockets full of kite 
string in case of a lightning storm; Thomas Jefferson, lugging the 
newest student enrollment list of the University of Virginia; 
John Adams, with a sheet of paper and pen, ready to write a 
quick note to Abigail about tonight’s ghostly proceedings; 
Alexander Hamilton, carrying a wad of new ten dollar bills 
which he fondles deliciously. Other founders file silently into the 
hall, taking seats without pulling them out from the tables they 
face, so that their insubstantive frames are partly buried in the 
tables in front of them. 
Last of all, another ghost arrives. However, his ghostly 
personage is not clad in the knee breeches and wigs worn by the 
other ghosts in the hall. He arrives wearing a tie and a long black 
 * Mr. Ostler is currently on the faculty at the TC Beirne School of Law in the 
University of Queensland at Brisbane, Australia. He originally obtained his JD from BYU 
and practiced law in Utah for eleven years, then relocated to Australia where he obtained 
a Ph.D. in legal history from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. 
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robe. He wears glasses and has the appearance of being a kindly 
old grandfather. He is Justice Harry Blackmun. 
“Gentlemen,” begins President Washington, looking 
dispassionately on the assemblage. “We are here today to discuss 
abortion in America. This is not a court and we will not pass 
judgment. It is a discussion only.” Turning toward Blackmun, he 
nods his head slightly. “We will commence by allowing Mr. Justice 
Blackmun to present his support for the Roe v. Wade decision he 
penned, which continues to be the primary abortion case in 
America.1 You may proceed, sir.” 
Blackmun’s ghost clears his nonexistent throat. 
“Distinguished founders,” he says in his mild voice, “I thank you 
for this opportunity to present Roe v. Wade to you. As I stated in 
my opinion, my hope and my purpose in that case ‘[was] to resolve 
the issue of abortion by constitutional measurement, free of 
emotion and predilection.’”2 
“Excuse me sir,” interposes Mr. Madison from his chair. “I 
have been reading your subsequent decision in the 1989 case of 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in which your opinion in 
Roe was somewhat modified in ways you did not approve.3 You 
asserted that in doing so the majority had been deceptive,4 had 
engaged in a tortured effort to defend its position,5 that their 
reasoning was unadulterated nonsense,6 and that they were 
cowardly.7 Are you asserting that such statements uttered when 
you were no longer safely on the side of the majority were free of 
emotion or predilection?” 
“Yes, well . . .” mumbled Blackmun incoherently. “Let me 
continue and I’m sure the import of my opinion will become clear. 
What was at issue in Roe was a Texas law which stated that if 
anyone administered a drug or other means to a woman to 
procure an abortion, he or she could be imprisoned.”8 
“I am impressed with this new State of Texas,” said 
Alexander Hamilton, rising to his feet. A crisp, new ten dollar 
bill was pinned to his outer cloak. “This law sounds almost the 
same as the 1716 law of my home City of New York, which 
 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Id. at 116. 
 3. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 4. Id. at 538. 
 5. Id. at 544. 
 6. Id. at 556 n.11. 
 7. Id. at 559. 
 8. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 n.1.  
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made it illegal for a midwife or anyone attending a pregnant 
woman to ‘administer any herb medicine or potion or any other 
thing to any woman being with child whereby she should 
destroy or miscarry.’”9 
Blackmun’s eyes bulged at the revelation of this law that 
predated his Roe opinion by 257 years. “Are you quite sure of that 
law?” he said testily. “After all, I asserted in my opinion that ‘the 
restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States 
today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws . . . are not of 
ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from 
statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of 
the 19th century.’10 I further stated that America’s first anti-
abortion law was passed in Connecticut in 1821.11 Because of this 
I concluded that ‘at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, 
and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion 
was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes 
currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a 
substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does 
in most States today.’”12 
Several of the founding ghosts had jumped to their feet. “If I 
may correct the misguided gentleman,” said Benjamin Franklin, 
“I indicated as early as 1728 through a fictional character I created 
that abortion was intolerable in American society. When Samuel 
Keimer had the audacity to publish a short article about abortion 
in his newspaper, I responded with an opposition by my fictional 
character ‘Celia Shortface’ who expressed outrage against Keimer 
that ‘thou would have printed such things . . . as would make all 
the modest and virtuous women in Pennsylvania ashamed!’”13 
“And I wish to assure you sir, that the 1716 law I referred to 
is genuine,” said Mr. Hamilton. “Indeed, this law was similar to 
others enacted in England as early as 1512.”14 Blackmun’s eyes 
bulged some more. 
“And I also rise to assure you sir,” interposed Mr. Madison, 
“that you are greatly mistaken if you believe abortion was not 
 9. 3 MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1675–1776, 
at 122 (1905) (a law for regulating midwives within the City of New York, July 27, 1716). 
 10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. 
 11. Id. at 138. 
 12. Id. at 140. 
 13. A BENJAMIN FRANKLIN READER 46 (Walter Isaacson ed., 2003). 
 14. Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Marzen, Abortion and Midwifery: A Footnote in 
Legal History, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION, 199 (Thomas W. Hilgers et 
al. eds., 1981).  
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viewed with disfavor at the time of the adoption of our 
Constitution. I have been perusing your opinion in Roe, and note 
that the claimant was a single, unmarried woman who was great 
with child.15 This precise situation was covered in our day by what 
were known as the concealment statutes in many of the colonies, 
intended to protect the mysterious deaths of bastard children 
found dead, regardless of whether their death was induced prior 
to or after their birth. In other words, these laws covered both 
abortion and infanticide. Indeed, these laws were patterned after 
a 1623 Act of Parliament entitled ‘An Act to Prevent the 
Destroying and Murdering of Bastard Children.’”16 
Blackmun’s eyes were now bulging so much they 
threatened to pop off his glasses. “Indeed,” exclaimed 
Alexander Hamilton, “I was against a proposed revision to just 
such a concealment law in New York in 1787. However, my 
opposition was not a support of abortion but rather an 
objection that the law could unfairly penalize women with a 
legitimate stillbirth, rather than targeting women who 
intentionally aborted their children. The law provided for a 
murder charge for ‘women who clandestinely were delivered of 
children and the same die, or be born dead,’ and required that 
in order to avoid the charge ‘the mother within one month 
thereafter, should before a magistrate be obliged to produce 
one witness at least, to prove that the child was not murdered; 
and in default of the same, to be deemed guilty of murder.’17 
This law unfairly reversed the presumption that a person is 
innocent until proven guilty, and ‘the operation of this law 
compelled her to publish her shame to the world’ in order to 
avoid a conviction. In my comments to the New York 
legislature on this law I ‘expatiated feelingly on the delicate 
situation it placed an unfortunate woman in, who might by 
 15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. 
 16. 21 Jac. I. c. 27. The 1623 act appears to have been directed more toward 
infanticide since it presumed an unmarried woman found with a dead child was guilty 
of murder unless she could produce a witness saying the child had been “born dead,” 
although elsewhere it made reference to whether the child “were born alive or not” 
(emphasis added). As the Hamilton and Jefferson quotes which follow below 
demonstrate, the American adaptations of the concealment law stated that even 
where a child was born dead there was a presumption of murder, unless the woman 
could produce a witness saying the child had not been murdered. For two additional 
examples of colonial and early state concealment acts other than New York and 
Virginia, see 1 N.H. Original Act 96 (enacted 1714); Act of 1719, ch. 22, 1719 Del. 
Laws § 6 at 67. 
 17. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1962).  
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accident be delivered stillborn.’18 I was untroubled however at a 
murder conviction for women whose stillbirth was not 
accidental.” 
“I opposed a revision in 1778 to Virginia’s concealment law 
for the very same reason,” said Thomas Jefferson, rising to his 
feet. “I noted in the debates on this revision to the law that ‘so 
many children die before or soon after birth that to presume all 
those murdered who are found dead, is a presumption which 
will lead us oftener wrong than right, and consequently would 
shed more blood than it would save.’19 In our day, before the 
miracles of modern technology known to your world, I 
acknowledged that such matters are difficult to prove, but that 
proof was still possible in some cases. I urged that such matters 
not be settled by a legal presumption of guilt but by referral to 
a ‘jury who are in a regular course to hear presumptive as well 
as positive testimony.’20 I noted that such a jury could rely on 
better evidence than mere action by the accused within a 
month—’circumstantial proof will do; for example, marks of 
violence, the behavior, countenance, &c., of the prisoner, &c.’21 
Naturally this would include marks of violence on the bodies of 
both the mother and child, which may have been inflicted 
before or after birth.” 
“Well said,” noted Madison, beaming over at his old friend. 
“I note that England clarified and replaced its old concealment 
law in 1803 with wording that specifically identified abortion as 
criminal and no longer allowed for a murder conviction based on 
presumption.”22 Madison then looked over at Blackmun, his face 
hardening. “I also note, Mr. Blackmun, that you mentioned this 
1803 English law in your opinion, but for some reason failed to 
mention that it was a revision of the anti-abortion concealment 
laws that had existed since 1623, 23 and indeed you characterized 
 18. Id. (emphasis added). 
 19. THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE 
VIEWS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 598 (John P. Foley ed., 1900). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 
100-07 (2006). 
 23. The lengthy title of the 1803 Act is as follows: 
An act for the further prevention of malicious shooting, and attempting to 
discharge loaded firearms, stabbing, cutting, wounding, poisoning and the 
malicious using of means to procure the miscarriage of women; and also the 
malicious setting fire to buildings; and also for repealing a certain act, made in 
England in the twenty-first year of the late King James the First, entitled “An act to 
prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard children . . . .” 43 Geo. III c. 58, 
§3 (1803, emphasis added).  
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it as ‘England’s first criminal abortion statute.’24 Is this a further 
example of how your Roe opinion was supposedly issued ‘free of 
emotion and of predilection?’”25 
Blackmun’s hands were beginning to shake a bit, and he 
swayed briefly on his feet. With a cracked voice, however, he 
quickly sought to defend his position. “The Texas law is not like 
the concealment statutes you have been speaking of, since it ‘fails 
to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.’”26 
“Are you suggesting sir,” said James Mason, rising to his feet, 
“that an abortion by a married woman was acceptable, even 
though the concealment laws in all the colonies and early states 
forbade such an action by an unwed mother? Just what is the basis 
for such a proposition?” 
“The common law, of course,” said Blackmun confidently, 
sure that he had now found his sure defense. “As I stated in my 
opinion in Roe, ‘It is undisputed that at common law, abortion 
performed before “quickening”—the first recognizable 
movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th 
to the 18th week of pregnancy—was not an indictable offense. 
The absence of a common-law crime for pre-quickening 
abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of 
earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law 
concepts of when life begins.’”27 
“Surely you jest!” cried several voices at once, as nearly half 
the founders in the hall rose angrily to their feet. The ghost of 
Mr. Washington on the president’s chair found it necessary to 
pound his nonexistent gavel to quiet the group. “One at a time, 
if you please gentlemen. After all, we still have several hours 
before the dawn when we must return to our graves.” 
“Are you suggesting sir,” said James Madison in a biting 
tone as he stared angrily at Blackmun, “that the common law is 
justification for your opinion in Roe?” 
“Yes,” said Blackmun without hesitation. “There was no 
other law on the subject so naturally I turned to the common 
law.” 
Within the body of the act, the new abortion law is set forth, followed by repeal of the old 
1623 concealment law because “doubts have been entertained respecting the true nature 
and meaning” of the old concealment law, and “the same have been found in sundry cases 
difficult and inconvenient to be put in practice.” Id. 
 24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 136 (1973). 
 25. Id. at 116. 
 26. Id. at 148. 
 27. Id. at 132-33.  
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Washington again had to resort to the gavel to bring order to 
the assemblage. “I presume,” he then said to Blackmun, “that 
when you say there was no other law on the subject you are 
ignoring the concealment and midwife laws that have already 
been pointed out to you as effective in all the colonies in the 
1780s?” 
“Well, yes . . .” said Blackmun, swallowing hard. “I’m afraid 
I was a bit . . . in the dark about those. But that is of no importance. 
The common law was clearly the basis of my decision.” 
Madison was shaking his head sadly. “Was I so quickly 
forgotten?” he asked in a pained voice. “Did I not clearly say that 
the common law was full of ‘incongruities, barbarisms and bloody 
maxims’28 and that it ‘never was nor by any fair construction ever 
can be deemed a law for the American people?’29 And then sir, 
using language so clear it could not possibly be mistaken, did I not 
say that resort by the Supreme Court to the common law ‘would 
confer on the judicial department a discretion little short of a 
legislative power,’30 resulting in their deciding ‘what parts of the 
common law would, and what would not, be properly applicable 
to the circumstances of the United States. A discretion of this sort 
has always been lamented as incongruous and dangerous . . . the 
power of the judges over the law would, in fact, erect them into 
legislators, and . . . it would be impossible for the citizens to 
conjecture, either what was or would be law?’31 Did I not say these 
things? Had they no effect on you?” 
“With all due respect,” Blackmun said, taking courage on the 
basis that Madison was short and not at all imposing, “your 
personal views of the common law are hardly binding on a 
decision of the Supreme Court today.” 
“The audacity!” cried Jefferson, rising to his feet. “Many 
states of the union specifically adopted the common law as 
applicable in their jurisdictions.32 The federal government had the 
 28. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790–1802: COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 380 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
 29. Id. at 381. 
 30. Id. at 380. 
 31. Id. at 381. 
 32.  Examples of some states that adopted the common law either in their 
constitution or by statute include DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776); MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. 
VI (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. II (1784); N.Y. CONST. art. 35 (1777); S.C. CONST. art. 7 (1790).  
In contrast, a number of judges and prominent officials in the 1790s (in addition to Madison 
as noted in the text) pointed out that the common law was never adopted by the federal 
government.  See, e.g., United States v. Worrall, 28 F.Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) 
(Justice Chase stating, “[I]n my opinion, the United States, as a Federal government, have  
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same opportunity, yet refused to do so. Tell me where in the 
United States Constitution the common law was adapted in like 
manner? What then was your basis for adopting the common law 
in this case?” 
“Well . . . ,” mumbled Blackmun, trying to think fast to 
counter an argument he had never heard before, “because as I 
said before there was no law on the subject. After all, we had to 
turn somewhere.” 
“Have you never heard of natural law, Mr. Blackmun?” 
demanded Hamilton. “As I said to Samuel Seabury in 1775, you 
should ‘apply yourself without delay to the study of the law of 
nature. I would recommend to your perusal Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Locke, Montesquieu and Burlemaqui.’”33 
“Indeed,” thundered Jefferson, “did I not say as plainly as it 
could be said in the Declaration of Independence that our very 
justification for treason and willful rebellion against the crown 
was the law of nature?34 Such laws are superior even to the 
Constitution! Without them there would be no United States!” 
“Precisely,” said James Wilson in his Scottish brogue. “I wrote 
a book on the subject of natural law! Did you miss it somehow?” 
Having put his foot in his mouth, Blackmun now added a few 
comments that were sure to result in his shoving it deeper down 
his throat. “But gentlemen,” he cried, “there is nothing in the 
Constitution about the laws of nature being superior as you say!” 
The outcry in the hall was now so tumultuous, it looked 
almost as if it would result in nonphysical violence. “Blasphemy!” 
cried the hot-headed Patrick Henry. “Unbelievable ignorance in 
one sitting on the highest court!” said John Marshall. Madison 
then turned to Blackmun and asked simply, “Have you never 
heard of the Ninth Amendment, Mr. Blackmun? I know you 
no common law . . . the United States did not bring it with them from England; the 
constitution does not create it; and no act of congress has assumed it”); 9 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1905) (in a letter to Edmund Randolph 
on Aug. 23, 1799, Thomas Jefferson  wrote “[T]he common law did not become, ipso facto, 
law on the new [federal] association; it could only become so by a positive adoption”); 
Steward Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 app. at 
1326 (1985) (using a rather confusing double negative in letter to St. George Tucker on 
Nov. 27, 1800, John Marshall wrote “The opinion which has been controverted is, that the 
common law of England has not been adopted as the common law of America by the 
constitution of the United States.  I do not believe one man can be found who maintains 
the affirmative of this proposition . . . I never suspected that an attempt would be made to 
represent this as a serious opinion entertained by respectable men.”). 
 33. 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 86. 
 34. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).  
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have—since you mentioned it several times in your opinion. 
Indeed, I was amazed that you partly based your ‘finding’ of a so-
called right of privacy on the Ninth Amendment.35 However, you 
very sadly misinterpreted it. Do you honestly believe that we, the 
framers of the very constitution which you profess to honor, 
would have inserted a provision like the Ninth Amendment 
intending to give leave for each succeeding generation to defy the 
very principles on which the Constitution was based, and thereby 
undermine the entire structure? Do you think of us as such fools, 
Mr. Blackmun?” Poor Mr. Madison was shaking, and since he was 
a ghost it obviously was not because he was cold. 
“What my friend means,” said Jefferson, “is that the Ninth 
Amendment was intended to protect natural law rights. Even 
scholars in your day who have studied the Ninth Amendment 
agree that this was our intent.36 These natural law rights are 
immutable and unchangeable, and cannot be ‘created’ at a 
whim based on fluctuating values of society.” Seeing 
Blackmun’s somewhat confused look, he said, “You and I are 
both lawyers, Mr. Blackmun. And you and I both know what 
an ‘incorporation by reference clause’ is in a contract. It is a 
clause inserted into a contract which incorporates other terms 
not contained in the written instrument. That is precisely what 
the Ninth Amendment was and is, since the Constitution itself 
is essentially a compact or contract of the people. And what 
contract lawyer in his right mind would incorporate terms to be 
made up at a whim in the future? That would nullify the entire 
contract and render it void. No, Mr. Blackmun. To incorporate 
something by reference it must be currently in existence. The 
rights to be incorporated by the natural law as part of the 
Constitution through the Ninth Amendment were natural law 
rights as we understood them in our day.” 
“I said as much in 1790,” interjected Madison, rising again to 
his feet, “when I likened the government we created to a building 
or improvement, and said ‘the improvements made by the dead 
form a debt against the living, who take the benefit of them. This 
 35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 36. See, e.g., BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT: A 
CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL 
CONDITIONS OF TODAY 19 (1955); DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE 
“SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T 
KNOW THEY HAVE 8 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It 
Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006); Duane L. Ostler, Rights Under the Ninth Amendment: 
Not Hard to Identify After All, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 35 (2013).  
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debt cannot be otherwise discharged than by a proportionate 
obedience to the will of the Authors of the improvements.’”37 
“Oh?” said Blackmun vaguely, his head swimming with the 
astounding impact of all the uncontemplated ideas he had heard 
that night. Then he said stupidly, “But there is nothing in natural 
law against abortion.” 
“I beg to differ,” said Jefferson. “Ask my colleagues in this 
hall! We have all read and studied the natural law writers referred 
to by my old enemy, Mr. Hamilton. For example, did you know 
that one of my favorite natural law writers, John Locke, listed a 
number of wrong and unacceptable actions such as ‘not to kill 
another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure 
abortion; not to expose . . . children; not to take from another what 
is his?’”38 Not only that, but Locke stated clearly that ‘the body of 
an embryo, dying in the womb, may be very little, not the 
thousandth part of an ordinary man. For since from the first 
conception and beginning of formation, it has life.’”39 
“Aye, but that’s not all,” added James Wilson with a twinkle 
in his eye. “The great natural law writer Pufendorf said ‘Obligation 
has also been enjoined upon parents by the law of nature that . . . 
they not destroy by abortion the offspring conceived within their 
flesh.’40 And on another occasion he clearly showed abortion is 
wrong from the moment of conception when he noted that ‘now by 
him who is not yet a part of the world we understand one who has 
not yet been conceived, not one who is still in the womb.’”41 
“And don’t forget the words of Montesquieu,” added 
Jefferson, “when he stated that ‘there is among savages another 
custom . . . it is the cruel practice of abortion.’42 I rather like this 
reference, since I myself referred to abortion in describing the 
uncivilized practices of the American savages, and how they 
stopped such barbarity upon becoming civilized.”43 
“Really?” Blackmun blurted without thinking. “You wrote 
against abortion?” 
 37.  5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1787-1790, supra note 28, at 439. 
 38. 1 JOHN LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES 48 (12th ed. 1824). 
 39. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 40. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE 283 
(William A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1931) (1660). 
 41. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, EIGHT BOOKS ON NATURAL RIGHTS 657 (Charles H. 
Oldfather & William A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). 
 42. CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE PERSIAN LETTERS 218 
(Herat ed. 1901) (1721). 
 43. 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 153 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-99).  
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“And so did I,” said John Adams, rising to his feet. “I spoke 
against it when praising the virtues of the Greek reformer 
Lycurgus, who refused to let his sister-in-law have an abortion 
after his brother died, even though it cost him the throne.”44 
Blackmun suddenly shook his head as if to clear it from a 
fog. Then he looked them all in the eye and said firmly, “Well, 
the common law still said abortion is not criminal prior to 
quickening, and is not equivalent with murder even after 
quickening, since apparently that is when the people of your 
generation thought life began.” 
There were several exclamations of anger through the hall. 
“Have you not been listening, man?” cried Benjamin Rush, rising 
to his feet. “Locke and Pufendorf both said life is to be protected 
from conception! That’s the law of nature! And furthermore, I 
was one of the few founders trained as a doctor—and I clearly 
stated that life’s ‘first motion is produced by the stimulus of the 
male seed upon the female ovum . . . [n]o sooner is the female 
ovum thus set in motion and the foetus formed, than its capacity 
of life is supported.’”45 
“And what of my opinion printed in the New York Journal 
in 1788 as part of the debate over ratifying the Constitution,” said 
Hugh Hughes, one of the sons of liberty. “I clearly stated that ‘the 
term “person” may include every human creature, whether born 
or unborn.’46 This contradicts your claim that the word person 
does not include the unborn.”47 
“And as for the common law,” said James Wilson, “I clearly 
stated that ‘in the contemplation of law, life begins when the infant 
is first able to stir in the womb,’ and from that point is to be 
protected.48 That stirring is the point of ‘quickening’ which you 
mention in your Roe opinion. But don’t you see the qualification 
in my statement? ‘In the contemplation of law’ clearly shows that 
philosophical ideas about when life begins have nothing to do with 
the common law abortion rule! Rather, that rule is all about 
 44. 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 549 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
 45. 2 BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS 406 (2d ed. 1805). 
 46. 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES 664 (Wis. Hist. 
Soc'y Press 2004). 
 47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“All this, together with our 
observation . . . that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal 
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ 
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”). 
 48. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1068 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark 
David Hall eds., 2007) (emphasis added).  
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evidence! In our day, we couldn’t prove a child was alive and 
protectable until its mother could feel it!49 After all, a murder 
charge is very serious! Are you going to send a man to the gallows 
without sufficient evidence?” 
“I heartily agree,” said Alexander Hamilton, fingering the 
ten dollar bill on his cloak. “The common law in New York was 
summarized by James Parker in 1764, who cited Lord Hale for the 
proposition that in an abortion case in our day ‘it cannot be legally 
known whether the child were killed or not.’50 That’s why an 
indictment against a person for killing an unborn child was 
refused in the 1348 Abortionist’s Case in England, because in the 
words of the opinion ‘it is difficult to know whether he killed the 
child or not.’51 Clearly, the rule was solely one of evidence.” 
“And if that’s not enough for you,” continued James Wilson, 
“consider another common law principal espoused by 
Blackstone—the same Blackstone that you cited in support of 
your decision.52 When he gave the common law rule for executing 
a woman who was found guilty of a capital offense and who 
claimed to be pregnant, he said ‘the judge must direct a jury of 
twelve matrons or discreet women to inquire the fact; and if they 
bring in their verdict quick with child (for barely with child, unless 
 49.  See PELEG W. CHANDLER, 2 AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRAILS 3-58 (1841-1844; 
reprinted 1970). One of the best examples of this is the case of Bethesda Spooner, who was 
convicted of conspiracy to murder her husband in 1778 and sentenced to death. She 
claimed she was pregnant and thus her execution should be delayed. Under the common 
law as expressed by Blackstone, in such a case “the judge must direct a jury of twelve 
matrons or discreet women to inquire the fact; and if they bring in their verdict quick with 
child, (for barely with child, unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient,) execution shall 
be stayed.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *395. Hence, the same “quick 
with child” standard applied, but the italicized portion emphasized that if the jury 
somehow had a way to verify the child was “alive in the womb” while the mother was 
“barely with child” before quickening, the child’s life was to be protected. Because such a 
thing could not be conclusively shown in that day, however, the jury was to determine 
whether she was “quick with child,” or in other words the child could be felt. In Spooner’s 
case, a jury of discreet matrons was called and her execution was stayed while they 
performed their examination and gave their report. They said she was not pregnant. 
However, Spooner continued to insist she was and asked for another examination, which 
was given. This time three of the midwives said she was pregnant. However, other matrons 
disagreed and the state Executive Council ordered the execution to proceed. Upon 
Spooner’s death she was examined and a five month old “perfect male fetus” was found 
inside her, and “it was thus discovered, but too late, that a great and humane principle, to 
be found in the laws of all civilized nations, had been violated.” 
 50. JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND 
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 216–17 (1764) (emphasis added). 
 51. ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT f. 268, pl. 263 (1st ed. 
1516). See also, JOHN M. RIDDLE, EVE’S HERBS: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION AND 
ABORTION IN THE WEST 96 (1997) (discussing and quoting the Abortionist’s Case). 
 52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 135.  
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it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient), execution shall be stayed 
generally till the next session.’53 His reference to ‘barely with 
child’ was clearly a reference to the time prior to quickening—and 
his statement ‘unless it be alive in the womb’ clearly shows that if 
it was possible to show the child alive in that prior stage, it would 
be protected. It wasn’t possible to prove that in our day—but it is 
in yours! You yourself mentioned how ‘modern medical 
techniques’ have changed.54 With modern technology, a fetal 
heartbeat can be detected at approximately the 25th day after 
conception,55 which is about the time most women even realize 
they’re expecting! Even your modern first trimester abortion 
procedures are almost never performed prior to this time! 
“Which means,” said Alexander Hamilton firmly, “that the 
common law rule is an evidentiary rule, requiring protection of 
the unborn from the earliest time that movement can be detected. 
And today, that is from the 25th day after conception!” He looked 
at Blackmun sharply. “You know as well as I do that you 
acknowledged in your Roe opinion yet another common law rule, 
that for inheritance purposes, a child has his property protected 
from the moment of conception.56 In the words of an illustrious 
judge from my state of New York in 1913, under such a rule ‘one 
must respect the rights of ownership and . . . disregard the safety 
of the owner. In such argument there is not true sense of 
proportion in the protection of rights. The greater is denied.’”57 
There was silence in the great hall for a moment. Resounding 
silence. Deathly silence, since none but the dead were present. All 
eyes were turned on Mr. Blackmun. He merely returned their 
gaze, but said nothing. Then slowly, without another word, he 
turned and retreated toward the back part of the hall. As he 
walked through the wall he disappeared. 
George Washington pounded his gavel on the podium, 
waking up some of the less active founders present who had dozed 
off during the proceedings. “Thank you all for your attendance 
and comments,” he said. “The pity of course is that neither Mr. 
Blackmun nor we are in a position to alter the current state of 
things in America today. Much as we love this nation for which 
 53. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *395 (emphasis added). 
 54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149. 
 55. Natan Haratz-Rubinstein & Ilan E. Timor-Tritsch, The Role of Ultrasound in 
Oocyte Donation Programs, in PRINCIPLES OF OOCYTE AND EMBRYO DONATION 121, 
144 (Mark V. Sauer ed., 1998). 
 56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
 57. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 154 A.D. 667, 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913).  
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we sacrificed so much, it is left to other hands and minds and 
hearts to resolve this issue.” 
There were general nods of agreement. Slowly President 
Washington rose from his chair and strode from the hall, 
disappearing into the blackness of the night. After collecting his 
notes and papers, James Madison followed. The others dispersed 
slowly, some talking in groups, others merely looking around to see 
how the hall had changed since they had last visited it. One by one 
they all went out into the night and were scattered to the wind. 
Last to leave was Benjamin Franklin. And as he passed from 
the hall and noticed developing storm clouds in the eastern sky, 
he happily clutched the kite string in his pocket and smiled in 
anticipation. 
 
 
